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Abstract:
The following paper discusses general notions of rationality and their relation to deception; in particular
how accepted notions of validity and truth are involved in deception. The paper introduces a theoretical
account of communication and deception, and presents two controversial arguments that draw the different
issues of this paper together.
Introduction:
Current research in deception has shown that there are linguistic patterns in deceptive communication
signalled through negations; closer inspection of these types of communication reveal that there is a logical
structure to some deceptive arguments. These findings have implications for notions of rationality, because
they challenge everyday notions of truth and validity. The first section of this paper presents the current
issues in the study of rationality in psychology, the next two sections provide a background to
communication in general and deceptive communication. The final section returns to rationality, and
controversially proposes that deceptive communication can be taken as an example of rationality, and that
all communication is deceptive communication.
Rationality
Rationality is considered to be uniquely human; it sets us apart from other species, and is one of the highest
forms of thought. It is inextricably involved with concepts such as logic, deduction, and is defined as an
ability to reason or having the quality of reasonableness; characterised by properties such as being
methodical, and presenting clearly stated arguments, beliefs or opinions. Debates as to whether humans are
rational have reached a point, at least in psychological literature, where there can be an acceptable
resolution; i.e. that the approach taken largely determines how the question is answered. Although this
response may seem unsatisfactory it does at least capture the key elements of the debate. Stanovich and
West (1998) identified three approaches defined in relation to the general positions taken when studying
reasoning: descriptive, normative and prescriptive. Descriptive models account for response patterns
exhibited in empirical investigations of cognitive processes. Normative models embody standards of
cognitive activity, if these standards are met; they suggest that optimum accuracy and efficiency are
achieved, for deductive reasoning normative models would measure individuals’ performance in reasoning
tasks against logical answers. Prescriptive models accept the limitations of the cognitive system, and
prescribe the best method of solution based on our limited system. Given these three positions there are still
two possible answers to the question ‘Are humans rational?’ Taking a normative standpoint would result in
the answer ‘no’; assuming the prescriptive approach would also result in a ‘no’ answer, if however you
adopted the descriptive position then you would assume that humans are rational. The first two positions
require a standard by which to measure behaviour, and as a consequence human behaviour does not always
follow the principles of logic and is deemed irrational. If it is accepted that humans are fallible and using
normative models to measure human behaviour is unfair, then humans need not be judged as irrational.
Therefore depending on how the reasoning process is empirically investigated impacts on whether
individuals are considered to be rational or not.
There are many intricate issues that are involved in this debate, and for the purposes of this discussion they
will not be considered since they have less bearing on the main topic. However, it is noteworthy that
current debates on rationality in the study of reasoning have now entered a new domain, involving
conscious and unconscious processing. Dualist approaches to reasoning (Evans and Over, 1996; Sloman,
1996; Stanovich and West, 1998) now assume that it is divided into an unconscious (heuristic/non-
analytic/quick/effortless) process, and a conscious (analytic/effortful/slow) process; both of which have
different implications for how we are to understand human rationality. This also illustrates that the type of
approach to investigating reasoning is still a moot point and determines how rational humans are
considered to be.
Returning to the main discussion, another important aspect of rationality is what we accept to be true, and
valid: rationality is based not only on presenting clearly justifiable arguments, but also judging and
evaluating arguments in a fair manner. In logic truth and validity have a clearly defined status that does not
necessarily depend on context. Context often governs how individuals assess/evaluate/judge everyday
occurrences/facts/events as true or false in everyday terms, and although truth and falsity enter into degrees
when set in everyday life, they cannot in logical terms. The validity of a logical argument depends upon on
the structure of the argument and how the premises and conclusion adhere to the basic principles set out;
i.e. a sentential argument could not have true premises and a false conclusion, this would make the
argument false, but the argument would also be invalid, since it necessarily follows that if the premises are
true, then the conclusion must also be true.
Deception is one example where the individual is in a unique position of having to present an argument that
is false, but valid within the confines of the hearer’s knowledge of the given context. The deceiver aims to
present an argument that is considered true and credible, which relies on a general understanding of what
constitutes a valid plausible argument. The aim of this paper is to set out how classical concepts such as
truth, validity and rationality play a role in deception, and discusses how, in turn, deception has
implications for the way in which such concepts are understood within a logical framework and an
everyday context. The next sections provide a brief theoretical background to communication and
deceptive communication.
Communication: The rules and regulations
Communication is taken to mean a transmission of meaning, signals or symbols, from one domain to
another; furthermore, in order for the transmission between the two domains to be successful there has to
be a common code; this ensures that the transmission will be correctly conveyed and interpreted. This view
forms the basis of the Code Theory by Shannon and Weaver (1949). However, this is a rather limited view
of communication, and assumes that as long as the signal is conveyed correctly, it will be understood
correctly. Grice (1975) proposed that communication is far from a simple exchange of signals, but instead
rests on a set of intuitive rules; these can be obeyed or broken depending on the intentions of the
communication. ‘Conversational implicature’ a term used by Grice (1975) emphasises the point that
conventional meanings of words or phrases determine what is implicated, as well as facilitating the process
of determining what is conveyed. Stemming from this, Grice presents a general principle: Co-operative
principle, of which there are four categories; Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner, each contains several
maxims that underpin what he considered, if followed, to be accurate means of communicating. Quantity
refers to quantity of information provided in a communication, and should be balanced so as not give more
informative than required and not to provide less information than is required. Quality is based on the need
to make the communication true, in that it should be based on supporting evidence that is known to be true,
or else should not be conveyed if it is believed to be false. This category is of particular relevance, and will
be returned to later on in the discussion. The third category, Relation quite simply refers to the idea that
communication should be relevant. Finally, Manner relates to a number of important aspects of
communication that should include orderliness, and avoid obscurity, ambiguity, and prolixity. This
category will also be referred to again in the latter part of this discussion.
In summary, the process of communication is a simple exchange, however in human communication e.g.
conversation we accept that the exchange of information is less straightforward and how it is delivered and
received is dependent on implicit regulations.
Breaking conversational rules
In one sense the Co-operative principle proposed by Grice (1975) is necessary for conversation resulting in
mutual understanding of a fact. However, the principle can also be used as a means of detecting where
there are breakages in the normal processes of communication; one common example is ambiguity, and it
flouts the category of quality. Ambiguity occurs in circumstances where there are multiple meanings of a
given phrase, or word; this can often be avoided provided that an adequate context is available from which
to judge which interpretation is the relevant one. Grice suggests that the deliberate inclusion of ambiguous
statements in conversation is questionable, and that there is reason to suspect the nature of such an
inclusion. The effects of ambiguity cannot be found in logic for the very reason that it occurs in everyday
language, i.e. it does not have clearly defined concepts as it’s foundation. Context is used to eliminate the
different possible interpretations, although context itself has different meanings for different individuals.
Another element of communication that leads to problems of misinterpretation through lack of context are
negations; these are also treated as less favourable methods of communication, because pragmatically they
are confusing, lead to more errors in understanding, and are more difficult to process than affirming
statements. In the reasoning literature the detrimental effects of negations on processing and performance
are well documented. It is a widely accepted view that the inclusion of negations in a given statement
without a context will result in an effortful, time consuming, and error laden endeavour to assess it’s
validity (Cornish and Wason, 1970; Evans, 1972; Evans and Lynch, 1973; Wason, 1961; Wason, and
Johnson-Laird 1972; Wason and Jones, 1963).
Ambiguity and negations create problems for the recipient; without a valid context it becomes difficult to
evaluate the communication and determine which interpretation is the correct one. Grice (1975) suggested
that both these examples should be avoided if a clear message is to be communicated; however, they are
almost essential in deceptive communication.
At this point it is important to emphasise that so far the discussion has focused on ambiguity and negations
in the context of everyday communication, and although they flout conversational rules that facilitate
effective comprehension of a given communication, they are not deliberate. Furthermore the rules of
conversation are not rigid as in logic, and ambiguity and negations have a legitimate place in
communication, in contrast the next section will discuss where both these concepts can be used to the
deceivers advantage and genuinely flout the rules of conversation.
Deception Communication
Deceptive communication takes many forms, serves different purposes, and can be intentional or
unintentional. Concealment, exaggeration, equivocation, half-truths, irony, and misdirection can all be
considered as types of deceptive communication (Buller, Burgoon, Buslig and Roiger, 1994). Embedded in
deceptive communication are the behaviours that Grice (1975) strictly aimed to avoid, namely conveying
false information, and presenting information in an obscure and unclear way, flouting the categories quality
and manner.
Principally the aim of deceptive communication is to avoid revealing some fact, either to the self or to
others. Intentional deceptive communication is the deliberate attempt to conceal, however, unintentional
deception can occur depending on a number of factors based on a lack of context, and equivocation, and
results in confusion, misunderstandings, or humour (e.g. irony, which relies on similar linguistic patterns as
deception).
One important behavioural indicator of deception in communication is the inclusion of negations. A meta-
analysis conducted by DePaulo, Stone and Lassiter (1985) revealed that negative statements were second to
pupil dilation, as one of the most frequently occurring behavioural cues found in deception studies;
however, this cue was not perceived as signalling deceptive communication. This highlights two important
aspects of deception: first, negations feature heavily in deceptive communication, and secondly, they are
not detected as a means of indicating deceptive communication. Therefore using negations, in particular
equivocal negations (e.g. ‘I wasn’t sure’, ‘I don’t know’, ‘I couldn’t tell’) that are non-committal and
ambiguous, is the most effective linguistic device available to deceive.
The reasons for why such a type of communication is effective and why it is commonly used are illustrated
using the following example and explained using the tripartite model of deceptive communication (Osman
and Heath, 1999).
The Model
The Tripartite model sets out a hierarchical structure of three commonly occurring lies: fabrication
(outright lie), falsehoods (out right denial) and equivocal negations presented in figure 1.
‘E’ denotes the encoder (Liar), and ‘D’
denotes the decoder (recipient), the shaded
boxes around either the encoder or decoder
denote the presence of a context
(preconception) and the ticks and crosses
represent the ease and difficulty of processing
the lie. For example in the case of an
equivocal negation, a preconception
exists in the mind of the encoder and it is easy to
generate, conversely the decoder has no
preconception, and when attempting to assess
the equivocal negation it is difficult. The
following example also uses an
equivocal negation lie.
The Example
A: Did you go out anywhere?
B: I didn’t stay in.
B’s response is an equivocal negation, it does not
directly answer A’s question, B fails to give
an adequate context to the response, and as
a result is hard to determine where they went
out, rendering their reply ambiguous.
To begin in B’s mind the known fact is ‘I
stayed in’, this is the pre-conception and object
of B’s eventual lie, when A asks the question,
B negates the preconception, which results
in the reply ‘I didn’t stay in’. A must decode
the statement and ascertains that B was out. The
procedure is effortless for B because they
have a context in their mind of the event they
are to negate; negations help distance the deceiver from the event and can be easily executed. In turn, it is
more difficult for the recipient to convert the negation into an affirmative statement, than the other way
around. Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) and Clark (1972) propose that it is easier for the cognitive system
to encode affirmative, rather than negative statements; the process of conversion form negation to
affirmation is effortful and leads to errors, but necessary for comprehension. A recent study conducted by
Heath and Osman (2000) found that equivocal negations were rated as more credible than other types of lie,
and were harder to process leading to more errors in recall, which supports the model, and Wason and
Figure 1 Hierarchical processing model of
fabrication, falsehood and equivocation.
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Johnson-Laird (1972) and Clark’s (1972) assertions. Receivers have difficulty in converting the equivocal
negations to affirmative counterparts, and so it is easier to accept them as true than otherwise because they
are difficult to falsify.
In summary, negations and ambiguity are an important part of deceptive communication. In general
attempts are made to ensure that everyday communication is as clear and understood as possible in the least
effortful, time consuming way, in contrast deceptive communication relies on effortful, confusing and time
consuming means of conveying a false message. Truth and validity have been implicated in the discussion
so far but the final section explicitly focuses on how these concepts are involved in both types of
communication.
Truth and validity have the final say
The title question asks how rational is deception, the aim of the discussion so far has been to set the scene
(briefly) for what constitutes rationality, communication and deception. The remaining part of this paper
will draw the different elements of the discussion together in order to present two arguments: first, that
deceptive communication can be taken as an example of rationality, and second, all communication can be
construed as deceptive.
The paper has introduced a range of different issues from opposing ends; deception is typically represented
as lying, falsity and untruths, while rationality exemplifies truth, logic and balanced arguments. The aim of
this section is to examine where the relationship lies between deception and rationality. What makes a
rational argument is that it is reasonable, and therefore logical. A good logical argument should be valid,
and that depends on the relationship premises have to their conclusions. One interesting aspect of logic is
that if the premises are false and the conclusion is false the argument is valid. There is a conflict between
what is true and what is valid, and this is crucial to the present argument. In order to tell whether an
argument is valid, there is no need to know whether the premises and conclusion are true, it isn’t even
required that they are true. Validity is dependent on what is possibly the case, rather than what is actually
the case. Equivocal negations are examples of valid arguments that present a possible event, although not
the actual event, and in this sense they are logical. Consequently they are also examples of rational
communication because they follow the constraints of valid logical arguments. This argument may be
considered as a matter of detail and has no bearing in the real world; however, Heath and Osman (2000)
have shown that deceptive communication is rated as most credible when it includes equivocal negations,
despite it causing more confusion, misunderstandings, and difficulty in comprehension. Heath and Osman
(2000) and Osman and Heath (1999) argue that equivocal negations are effective because they are based on
reality (i.e. they negate a real event) and therefore closer to the true event, they are also easy to generate in
the mind of the deceiver and are too effortful for the receiver to falsify. These are information processing
reasons, but in terms of a linguistic analysis, equivocal negations are also logical and valid arguments in
their own right, and can also be judged as credible in logical terms. The important point here is that what
marks out effective deceptive communication are the same reasons that mark out an effective valid logical
argument; therefore it is fair to say that deceptive communication can be rational.
The second argument that concludes this paper is that all communication has an element of deception.
Grice’s (1975) maxims of conversation outline generally accepted, albeit implicit, rules that all individuals
pertain to when conversing, either by obeying or breaking them. The Code theory of communication
proposed that as long as the transmission is clear, and the code used to interpret the transmission is correct,
then there is no discrepancy between the message sent and the interpreted message. However,
communication between humans relies on context and relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986), and that does
not always ensure that the communication is true when it leaves the sender, and that the correct context is
used to interpret the message. Context relies on both parties (sender and receiver) to have similar
background knowledge, to interpret tone, intonation and idiosyncratic phrases in the same manner, from
among a multitude of possible interpretations of a communication, and most importantly to remember the
same concepts in the same way. Let us remind ourselves that deception is a essentially an act that leads to
misunderstanding and misinterpretation, as well as classical associations with falsehoods, in particular
lying. Most aspects of human communication can potentially lead to misapprehension simply because there
is no single way of interpreting a communication. There are different subtle mechanisms that can lead to
vastly different interpretations e.g. the statement ‘ I don’t think he is crazy’ given two different contexts
e.g. ‘I don’t think he is crazy- I know he is’ and ‘I don’t think he is crazy, just a little anti-social’. Both
examples are an admission that the person in question is ‘crazy’; the first is assertive, the second is more of
a placation. The statement itself suggests that a person is not crazy, that they are in fact sane, the
supplementary information that follows both versions suggests otherwise. Often we do not always have the
appropriate context to rule out one interpretation or another as possible, in normal conversation this is
problematic and can be construed as deceptive, in deceptive communication this is a necessary attribute
that leads to affective duping. Just as in the debate of whether humans are rational, considering whether
communication is deceptive or not depends on the view point, and the intentions behind the communication
which is often the most difficult to ascertain.
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